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____________ 
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_____________ 
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v. 
 
SCOTT LUCCHESI; COLLEGIATE SUBS, D/B/A Champs Sports Bar & Grill;  
STEPHANIE L. KLETT; ZACHARY A. SPENCER; CLINTON BONSON 
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                                                                        Appellants 
______________ 
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                                 Appellant 
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______________ 
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v. 
 
SCOTT LUCCHESI; COLLEGIATE SUBS, D/B/A Champs Sports Bar & Grill;  
STEPHANIE L. KLETT; ZACHARY A. SPENCER; CLINTON BONSON 
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CLINTON BONSON, 
                               Appellant   
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 (D.C. Civil No. 11-cv-00735) 
District Judge:  Honorable Yvette Kane 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 10, 2014 
____________ 
 
Before: RENDELL, HARDIMAN and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: April 11, 2014) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 State Automobile Mutual Insurance Company (“State Auto”) filed an action in the 
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania seeking a declaratory 
judgment that it had no obligation to defend nor indemnify Collegiate Subs, Inc. d/b/a 
Champs Sports Bar & Grill; its proprietor, Scott Lucchesi; and its former bartenders, 
Stephanie Klett and Zachary Spencer (together, the “Champs Defendants”), against a tort 
action filed by Clinton Bonson, a patron of Champs Sports Bar & Grill, who was hit by a 
taxi after leaving the bar intoxicated.  The Court found that the liquor liability exclusion 
contained in the State Auto policy barred coverage, and granted summary judgment.  
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Lucchesi, Collegiate Subs, Inc., Klett, and Bonson now appeal.  We will affirm. 
I 
 On the evening of October 24, 2009, Clinton Bonson had been drinking at Champs 
Sports Bar & Grill in State College, Pennsylvania.  He left the bar on foot, and proceeded 
to cross North Atherton Street, a major thoroughfare in town.  As he crossed, a speeding 
taxi hit him, and he was seriously injured.  Bonson filed suit (the “Underlying Action”) in 
the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County, Pennsylvania against the Champs 
Defendants, the taxi driver, and the driver’s operating company.   
 As claimed-insureds of a commercial general liability policy issued by State Auto, 
the Champs Defendants submitted claims for defense and indemnification.  State Auto 
began provisionally providing a defense, though it reserved its rights to deny coverage 
under the policy.  On April 18, 2011, it filed the above-mentioned declaratory judgment 
action based on the policy’s liquor liability exclusion.1 
 In relevant part, the policy at issue provided that: 
[State Auto] will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated 
to pay as damages because of “bodily injury” or “property damage” to 
which this insurance applies.  [State Auto] will have the right and duty to 
defend the insured against any “suit” seeking those damages.  However, we 
will have no duty to defend the insured against any “suit” seeking damages 
for “bodily injury” or “property damage” to which this insurance does not 
apply. 
 
                                                 
1
 We note with some dismay that the only documents in the Appendix are the Notice of 
Appeal and the Opinion and Order of the District Court.  We have had to retrieve the two 
essential documents on this appeal from the record before the District Court.  This should 
not have been necessary. 
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*  *  * 
 
Exclusions. . . 
 
 c. Liquor Liability 
 
“Bodily injury” or “property damage” for which any insured may be held 
liable by reason of: 
  
(1) Causing or contributing to the intoxication of any person; 
 
(2) The furnishing of alcoholic beverages to a person under the legal 
drinking age or under the influence of alcohol; or 
 
(3) Any statute, ordinance or regulation relating to the sale, gift, 
distribution or use of alcoholic beverages. 
 
Commercial Gen. Liab. Coverage Form of Policy No. PBP-9405827-14 at 1-2, attached 
as Ex. A to Dkt. No. 4 in 11-cv-735 (M.D. Pa.), pp. 15-29 (“CGL Form”). 
 In the Underlying Action, Bonson alleged that the Champs Defendants were liable 
for his injury for two principal reasons: (1) by failing to cut off service, they caused and 
enhanced the degree of his intoxication, in violation of both principles of common-law 
negligence and Pennsylvania’s Dram Shop Act, 47 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 4-492; and (2) 
they allowed him to leave the bar intoxicated, in violation of their common-law duty to 
monitor the premises for visibly intoxicated persons and undertake appropriate 
precautions to ensure their safety. 
State Auto moved for summary judgment.  The Champs Defendants (with the 
exception of Spencer, who never appeared) and Bonson cross-moved, arguing that the 
liquor liability exclusion did not apply to the claim that the Champs Defendants allowed 
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Bonson to leave the premises intoxicated, because that claim was premised on a failure to 
monitor Bonson, and not on the service of alcohol to him. 
The District Court granted State Auto’s motion, denied the cross-motions, and 
entered judgment for State Auto.  The Court found “no support in law” for a duty to 
prevent a bar patron “from leaving the establishment while intoxicated” unless “the bar 
created the dangerous condition” by “having furnished [the patron] with alcohol while he 
was visibly intoxicated.”  (A13-14.)  It therefore concluded that the two sets of claims 
were “inextricably intertwined,” and that “the sole basis for the claims raised” in the 
Underlying Action was “the service of alcohol.”  (A12, 14-15.)  It also rejected as 
unpersuasive Penn-Am. Ins. v. Peccadillos, 27 A.3d 259 (2011) (en banc), pet. for 
allowance of appeal denied, 613 Pa. 669 (2011), a case in which the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court held against an insurer under facts similar to those presented here. 
This timely appeal followed.   
II 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review of a district 
court’s order granting summary judgment and apply the same standard as the district 
court.  See Montone v. City of Jersey City, 709 F.3d 181, 189 (3d Cir. 2013).  “Summary 
judgment shall be granted where no genuine dispute exists as to any material fact, and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Id. 
III 
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 In determining State Auto’s obligations under the policy, we must consider the 
duty to defend separately from the duty to indemnify.  See Erie Ins. Exch. v. 
Transamerica Ins. Co., 516 Pa. 574, 583 (1987) (the duty to defend “is a distinct 
obligation, separate and apart from the insurer’s duty to provide coverage”).  The 
insurer’s “duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify,” Kvaerner Metals Div. v. 
Commercial Union Ins. Co., 589 Pa. 317, 330 n.7 (2006), in that an insurer must “defend 
its insured if the factual allegations of the complaint on its face encompass an injury that  
. . . is potentially” within the scope of the policy.  Am. & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Jerry’s Sport 
Ctr., Inc., 606 Pa. 584, 597, 609 (2010).  “[S]o long as the complaint filed by the injured 
party covered an injury which might or might not fall within the coverage of the policy[,] 
the insurance company [is] obliged to defend.”  Casper v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 
408 Pa. 426, 429 (1962) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 To determine whether a claim potentially falls within the scope of a policy, we 
compare “the four corners of the insurance contract to the four corners of the complaint.”  
Jerry’s Sport Ctr., Inc., 606 Pa. at 609.  In so doing, we interpret the policy as we would 
any other contract.  Thus, where the language of the policy is “clear and unambiguous,” 
we are “required to give effect to that language.”  Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. 
Sartno, 588 Pa. 205, 212 (2006) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 We also accept as true the “factual allegations of the underlying complaint,” 
Jerry’s Sport Ctr., Inc., 606 Pa. at 610 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted), 
and “liberally construe[]” them to determine whether they assert a potentially covered 
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claim.  Frog, Switch & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir. 
1999).  If the complaint contains “multiple causes of action,” one of which “would 
potentially constitute a claim within the scope of the policy’s coverage,” the insurer must 
defend the entire action until it can “confine the claim to a recovery excluded from the 
policy.”  Am. & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Jerry’s Sport Ctr., Inc., 948 A.2d 834, 846 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2008) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted), aff’d, 606 Pa. 584 
(2010); see Peccadillos, 27 A.3d at 267 (the “obligation to defend remains unless [an] 
exclusion clearly defeats every cause of action averred in the underlying complaint”).  
Finally, we resolve doubts regarding coverage “in favor of the insured.”  Frog, Switch & 
Mfg. Co., 193 F.3d at 746.   
 The language of the State Auto policy is unambiguous: there is no coverage for 
“damages” an insured becomes obligated to pay “because of” a “bodily injury . . . for 
which” the insured “may be held liable . . . by reason” of its “causing or contributing to 
the intoxication of any person,” “furnishing of alcoholic beverages to a person . . . under 
the influence of alcohol,” or violating a “statute . . . relating to the sale, gift, distribution, 
or use of alcoholic beverages.”  (CGL Form at 1-2.) 
 That language applies cleanly to the Complaint in this case and leaves no doubt 
that coverage is barred.  Every claim asserted seeks damages for the “bodily injury” 
Bonson suffered when he was hit by the taxi.  According to the Complaint, the Champs 
Defendants “may be held liable” for that injury “by reason” of their “causing [Bonson] to 
be intoxicated . . . at the time he attempted to cross the street,” “continuing to serve” 
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Bonson “despite his visible intoxication,” and “violating the statutes and laws of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, including, but not limited to” Pennsylvania’s Dram 
Shop Act.  See Compl. ¶¶ 43, 48, 52, attached as Ex. B to Dkt. No. 4 in 11-cv-735 (M.D. 
Pa.).  No portion of that Complaint “encompass[es] an injury” that “even potentially” 
falls within the scope of the policy, and State Auto had no duty to defend.  Jerry’s Sport 
Ctr., Inc., 606 Pa. at 597, 609.  It follows, therefore, that State Auto had no duty to 
indemnify.  See Kvaerner at 330 n.7 (“[I]f [an insurer] does not have a duty to defend . . . 
neither does it have the duty to indemnify.”). 
 The Champs Defendants concede that the liquor liability exclusion bars coverage 
of the claim that they served Bonson to excess.  They insist, however, that the exclusion 
cannot bar coverage of the claim that they allowed Bonson to leave the premises 
intoxicated.  But under the policy, if coverage of the former claim is excluded, so is 
coverage of the latter, as both claims seek “damages because of” the exact same “bodily 
injury.”  (CGL Form at 1.)  
 The Champs Defendants are quick to point out that, in theory, they could be held 
liable for allowing Bonson to leave the premises even if he had been intoxicated before 
he got there and stopped drinking once he arrived.  We must, however, accept as true the 
allegations of the Complaint, which do not describe that version of the events.  The 
Complaint unequivocally alleges that the Champs Defendants served Bonson to excess 
and are liable to him for that conduct. 
We also reject the Champs Defendants reliance on Peccadillos, in which the 
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Pennsylvania Superior Court ordered an insurer to defend a lawsuit seeking to hold a bar 
accountable for a fatal drunk driving accident because it had served the driver to excess 
and ejected him from the premises knowing he would drive home drunk.  The court, 
accepting the same reasoning advanced here by the Champs Defendants, held that the 
allegations regarding the bar’s ejection of the driver could in theory have been raised 
“regardless of whether [the] provision of alcohol had actually contributed to the [driver’s] 
intoxication.”  Peccadillos, 27 A.3d at 268. 
The District Court “acknowledge[d] that Peccadillos is similar to the present 
action,” but concluded that “the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not adopt such a 
standard.”  (A11-12, 17 at n.7).  We agree.  Bedrock principles of Pennsylvania law 
require us to rely on the facts alleged in the underlying Complaint, and not on 
hypothetical scenarios that reach well beyond the Complaint’s “four corners.”  Jerry’s 
Sport Ctr., Inc., 606 Pa. at 609; see also, Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. of Am. v. Allen, 547 Pa. 693, 
704 (1997) (“‘[T]he obligation to defend an action brought against the insured is to be 
determined solely by the allegations of the complaint in the action.’”) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Wilson v. Maryland Cas. Co., 377 Pa. 588, 594 (1954)).  So, too, must 
we give effect to the clear and unambiguous language of the policy at issue here.  As 
described in the Complaint, Bonson’s injury is allegedly one for which the Champs 
Defendants “may be held liable . . . by reason” of serving him too much alcohol.  (CGL 
Form at 1).  Under the language of the policy, all claims seeking damages for that injury 
are excluded from coverage. 
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IV 
 We will affirm the order of the District Court. 
 
 
